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Abstract. In this paper, we address the problem of achieving efficient
code-based digital signatures with small public keys. The solution we
propose exploits sparse syndromes and randomly designed low-density
generator matrix codes. Based on our evaluations, the proposed scheme is
able to outperform existing solutions, permitting to achieve considerable
security levels with very small public keys.
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1 Introduction
The problem of replacing current cryptographic primitives which will be sub-
ject to quantum computer attacks with alternative post-quantum solutions is
fostering research on code-based systems, which are among the most promising
options for this replacement.
Concerning asymmetric cryptography, the McEliece cryptosystem [21] and its
recent improvements [9] already represent efficient solutions to replace quantum
vulnerable systems, like RSA. The main drawback of the McEliece cryptosystem
compared to RSA is the large size of its public keys. However, great steps have
been done towards the reduction of the McEliece public key size. A possible
solution consists in replacing the Goppa codes used in the original system with
other families of codes. Among these, low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes
have been considered since several years [1–3, 24], and most recent proposals
based on them have been able to achieve significant reductions in the key size
[6, 7, 23].
For what concerns digital signatures, the widespread DSA and RSA signa-
ture schemes will be endangered by quantum computers as well, and only a few
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replacements are available up to now, like hash-based signatures. Code-based
digital signature schemes represent another post-quantum alternative to DSA
and RSA signature schemes, but the development of efficient code-based solu-
tions is still challenging.
The two main proposals of code-based signature schemes currently avail-
able are the Courtois-Finiasz-Sendrier (CFS) scheme [13] and the Kabatianskii-
Krouk-Smeets (KKS) scheme [18]. An up-to-date discussion about these two
systems can be found in [15] and [26], respectively.
The KKS scheme uses two codes with different sizes to create the trapdoor,
one selecting the subset support of the other. An important weakness of this
system was recently pointed out in [26], even though the KKS scheme can still
be considered secure for some choices of its parameters.
The CFS signature scheme instead uses a hash-and-sign paradigm based on
the fact that only the authorized signer can exploit the error correction capability
of a secret code. The main components of the CFS scheme are a private t-error
correcting code C and a public hash algorithm H. The private code is described
through its parity-check matrix H , while H ′ = S ·H is made public, where S is
a private random matrix. There must be a public function F able to transform
(in a reasonable time) any hash value computed through H into a correctable
syndrome for the code C. Then, syndrome decoding through C is performed by
the signer, and the resulting error vector e is the digital signature, together with
the parameters to be used in the function F for achieving the target. Verification
is easily obtained by computing H ′ · e and comparing the result with the output
of F .
The main drawback of the CFS scheme concerns the function F . In fact, it is
very hard to find a function that quickly transforms an arbitrary hash vector into
a correctable syndrome. In the original CFS scheme, two ways are proposed to
solve this problem [15]: i) appending a counter to the message, or ii) performing
complete decoding. Both these methods require a very special choice of the code
parameters to be able to find decodable syndromes within a reasonable time. For
this purpose, codes with very high rate and very small error correction capability
are commonly used, and this has exposed the cryptosystem to attacks based on
the generalized birthday algorithm [14], in addition to common attacks against
code-based cryptosystems. This flaw is mainly due to the need to ensure that
many vectors produced by the hash function H are correctable. In addition, in
such a setting, the decoding complexity can be rather high, especially in the
versions exploiting complete decoding.
In this paper, we propose a new solution based on a modification of the
CFS scheme. The first variation is to consider only a subset of the possible syn-
dromes, selecting the ones having a certain density (of not null elements). In
addition, we replace traditional Goppa codes with low-density generator-matrix
(LDGM) codes, which allow for a random based design and a considerable re-
duction in the public key size. As it will be shown in the following, this allows
to relax many constraints on the code parameters, and therefore to use more
practical codes which also make classical attacks against the CFS scheme inap-
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plicable. In addition, syndrome decoding through the private code is reduced to
a straightforward procedure, with an extremely low complexity. The rationale of
the proposed system is in the following observations:
– Given a private parity-check matrix in systematic form (with an identity
block in the rightmost part), the signer can obtain an error vector associated
to a given syndrome by simply transposing the syndrome and prepending
it with an all zero vector. By obtaining the public parity-check matrix from
the private one through a left and right multiplication by two dense secret
matrices, the systematic form is lost and the same procedure cannot be
exploited by an attacker. Moreover, the two parity-check matrices no longer
describe the same code.
– The private error vector obtained by the signer can be disguised by adding
to it a randomly selected codeword of the secret code.
– If both the private error vector and the random codeword are of moderately
low weight, and the same holds for their transposition into the public code,
they are difficult to discover by an attacker.
– If the private code is an LDGM code, it is very easy for the signer to randomly
select a low weight codeword, since it is obtained as the sum of a small
number of rows of its generator matrix, chosen at random. Although the
private code is an LDGM code, its parity-check matrix in systematic form
can be dense.
In the following sections we show how these observations are translated into
practice in the proposed system. The organization of the paper is as follows.
In Section 2, we describe the LDGM codes we use in the system and their
characteristics. In Section 3, we define the main steps of the system, that are:
key generation, signing procedure and verification procedure. In Section 4, we
provide a preliminary assessment of the possible vulnerabilities affecting the
system. In Section 5, we give some possible choices of the system parameters
and, finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Low-density generator-matrix codes
LDGM codes have been used since a long time for transmission applications [12],
and are recognized to achieve very good error correcting performance when used
in concatenated schemes [16], [17].
A simple way to obtain an LDGM code with length n, dimension k and
redundancy r = n− k is to define its generator matrix in the form
G = [Ik|D], (1)
where Ik is a k×k identity matrix, andD is a sparse k×rmatrix. We suppose that
the rows of G have Hamming weight wg ≪ n. An LDGM code can also be defined
with G in a more general form than (1), that is, by randomly selecting k linearly
independent vectors with length n and Hamming weight wg ≪ n, and using them
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as the rows of G. This approach requires to check the linear independence of the
rows of G, but it increases the degrees of freedom for random-based designs.
Hence, we consider this more general solution for the design of the private code
in the proposed system.
Due to their sparse nature, it is very likely that, by summing two or more rows
of the generator matrix of an LDGM code, a vector with Hamming weight ≥ wg
is obtained. In this case, the LDGM code has minimum distance wg. This is even
more likely if the rows of G are chosen in such a way as to be quasi-orthogonal,
that is, with a minimum number of overlapping ones. However, in the scheme
we propose, we do not actually need that the secret code has minimum distance
wg. Hence, G can be designed completely at random, without any constraint on
the number of overlapping ones between each pair of its rows.
The code defined through G as in (1) is systematic and admits a sparse parity
check matrix H in the form
H = [DT |Ir ], (2)
where T denotes transposition and Ir is an r × r identity matrix. Hence, such
a code is an LDPC code as well. On the contrary, if G is designed completely
at random, without imposing the form (1), it is not systematic and the LDGM
code is generally not an LDPC code. This is the case for the private LDGM code
which is used in the proposed system.
A particularly interesting class of LDGM codes is that of quasi-cyclic (QC)
LDGM codes [4]. In fact, the QC property allows to reduce the memory needed
to store the code characteristic matrices, which is an important feature in cryp-
tographic applications where such matrices are used as private and public keys.
A general form for the generator matrix of a QC-LDGM code is as follows:
GQC =


C0,0 C0,1 C0,2 . . . C0,n0−1
C1,0 C1,1 C1,2 . . . C1,n0−1
C2,0 C2,1 C2,2 . . . C2,n0−1
...
...
...
. . .
...
Ck0−1,0 Ck0−1,1 Ck0−1,2 . . . Ck0−1,n0−1

 , (3)
where Ci,j represents a sparse circulant matrix or a null matrix with size p× p.
Hence, in this case the code length, dimension and redundancy are n = n0p,
k = (n0 − r0)p = k0p and r = r0p, respectively. Since a circulant matrix is
defined by one of its rows (conventionally the first), storing a binary matrix
GQC as in (3) requires k0n0p = kn/p bits, and the corresponding parity-check
matrix HQC requires r0n0p = rn/p bits to be stored. The proposed system uses
a parity-check matrix as the public key; so, when adopting QC-LDGM codes,
its public key size is rn/p bits.
An important feature of LDGM codes which will be exploited in the proposed
scheme is that it is easy to obtain a random codeword c belonging to an LDGM
code and having weight approximately equal to a fixed, small value wc. Let us
suppose that wc is an integer multiple of wg. Since the rows of G are sparse,
it is highly probable that, by summing a small number of rows, the Hamming
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weight of the resulting vector is about the sum of their Hamming weights. Hence,
by summing wc
wg
rows of G, chosen at random, we get a random codeword with
Hamming weight about wc. Actually, due to some overlapping ones, the resulting
weight could result smaller than wc. In this case, some other row can be added,
or some row replaced, or another combination of rows can be tested, in order to
approach wc. Moreover, as we will see in the following, using a random codeword
with Hamming weight slightly smaller than wc is not a problem in the proposed
system. Based on the above considerations, the number of codewords with weight
close to wc which can be easily selected at random from an LDGM code having
G with rows of weight wg, with wg|wc, can be roughly estimated as
Awc ≈
(
k
wc
wg
)
. (4)
3 System description
In this section we describe the main steps of the proposed digital signature
system.
3.1 Key generation
The first part of the private key for the proposed system is formed by the r× n
parity-check matrix H of an LDGM code C(n, k), having length n and dimension
k (r = n− k). The matrix H is in systematic form, with an identity block in the
rightmost part. The private key also includes two other non-singular matrices:
an r×r transformation matrix Q and an n×n scrambling matrix S (both defined
below). The public key is then obtained as H ′ = Q−1 ·H · S−1.
The matrix S is a sparse non-singular matrix, with average row and column
weight mS ≪ n. The matrix Q, instead, is a weight controlling transformation
matrix as defined in [5]. For this kind of matrices, when s is a suitably chosen
sparse vector, the vector s′ = Q · s has a small Hamming weight, which is only a
few times greater than that of s. As shown in [5], a matrix Q with such a feature
can be obtained as the sum of an r × r low-rank dense matrix R and a sparse
matrix T , chosen in such a way that Q = R + T is non singular. In order to
design R, we start from two z× r matrices, a and b, with z < r properly chosen
(see below), and define R as:
R = aT · b. (5)
This way, R has rank ≤ z. The matrix T is then chosen as a sparse matrix with
row and column weight mT , such that Q = R+ T is full rank.
It can be easily verified that, if the vector s is selected in such a way that
b · s = 0z×1, where 0z×1 is the z × 1 all-zero vector, then R · s = 0r×1 and
s′ = Q · s = T · s. Hence, the Hamming weight of s′ is, at most, equal to mT
times that of s, and Q actually has the weight controlling feature we desire.
As we will see in Section 4.3, although it is relatively simple for an attacker
to obtain the space defined by the matrix b, and its dual space, this does not
6 M. Baldi, M. Bianchi, F. Chiaraluce, J. Rosenthal, D. Schipani
help to mount a key recovery attack. Hence, the matrix b, which is only a small
part of Q, can even be made public.
When a QC code is used as the private code, H is formed by r0×n0 circulant
matrices of size p× p, and it is desirable to preserve this QC structure also for
H ′, in such a way as to exploit its benefits in terms of key size. For this purpose,
both Q and S must be formed by circulant blocks with the same size as those
forming H . Concerning the matrix S, it is obtained in QC form (SQC) by simply
choosing at random a block of n0×n0 sparse or null circulant matrices such that
the overall row and column weight is mS .
Concerning the matrix Q, instead, a solution to obtain it in QC form is to
define R as follows:
RQC =
(
aTr0 · br0
)⊗ 1p×p, (6)
where ar0 and br0 are two z × r0 binary matrices, 1p×p is the all-one p × p
matrix and ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product. Then, TQC is chosen in the form
of n0 × n0 sparse circulant blocks with overall row and column weight mT and
QQC is obtained as RQC+TQC . This way, if H is in QC form,H
′ = Q−1QC ·H ·S−1QC
is in QC form as well. In the QC case, the condition we impose on s, that is,
b · s = 0z×1 becomes (br0 ⊗ 11×p) · s = 0z×1.
Such a condition, both in the generic and in the QC case, is equivalent to a set
of z parity-check constraints for a code with length r and redundancy z. Hence,
if we fix b such that this code has minimum distance d, then a vector s with
weight w < d cannot satisfy such condition, and Q loses its weight controlling
feature on s. This is useful to reinforce the system against some vulnerabilities,
and justifies the form used for the matrix Q.
Apart from the private and public key pair, the system needs two functions
which are made public as well: a hash functionH and a function FΘ that converts
the output vector of H into a sparse r-bit vector s of weight w ≪ r. The output
of FΘ depends on the parameter Θ, which is associated to the message to be
signed and made public by the signer. An example of implementation of FΘ is
provided in the next section.
3.2 Signature generation
In order to get a unique digital signature from some document M , the signer
computes the digest h = H(M) and then finds ΘM such that s = FΘM (h) verifies
b · s = 0z×1. Since s has weight w, s′ = Q · s has weight ≤ mTw. Concerning
the implementation of the function FΘ(h), an example is as follows. Given a
message digest h = H(M) of length x bits, similarly to what is done in the CFS
scheme, it is appended with the y-bit value l of a counter, thus obtaining [h|l].
The value of [h|l] is then mapped uniquely into one of the (r
w
)
r-bit vectors of
weight w, hence it must be
(
r
w
) ≥ 2x+y. The counter is initially set to zero by
the signer, and then progressively increased. This way, a different r-bit vector
is obtained each time, until one orthogonal to b is found, for l = l¯. This step
requires the signer to test 2z different values of the counter, on average. With this
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implementation of FΘ(h), we have ΘM = l¯, and different signatures correspond
to different vectors s, unless a hash collision occurs.
After having obtained s, the signer has to find a vector e of weight ≤ mTw
which corresponds to the private syndrome s′ = Q · s through C. Since H is in
systematic form, it can be written as H = [X |Ir], where X is an r×k matrix and
Ir is the r × r identity matrix. Hence, the private syndrome s′ can be obtained
from the error vector e = [01×k|s′T ]. So, in this case, finding e simply translates
into a vector transposition and some zero padding.
The signer finally selects a random codeword c ∈ C with small Hamming
weight (wc), and computes the public signature of M as e
′ = (e+ c) · ST . If the
choice of the codeword c is completely random and independent of the document
to be signed, the signature obtained for a given document changes each time it is
signed, and the system becomes vulnerable to attacks exploiting many signatures
of the same document. This can be simply avoided by choosing the codeword c as
a deterministic function of the document M and, hence, of the public syndrome
s. For example, s or, equivalently, [h|l¯] can be used as the initial state of the
pseudo-random integer generator through which the signer extracts the indexes
of the rows of G that are summed to obtain c. This way, the same codeword is
always obtained for the same public syndrome.
To explain the role of the codeword c, let us suppose for a moment that the
system does not include any random codeword, that is equivalent to fix c =
01×n, ∀M . In this case, we could write e′ =W (s), where W is a linear bijective
map from the set of public syndromes to the set of valid signatures. This can be
easily verified, since it is simple to check thatW (s1+s2) =W (s1)+W (s2). So, an
attacker who wants to forge a signature for the public syndrome sx could simply
express sx as a linear combination of previously intercepted public syndromes,
sx = si1 + si2 + . . . siN , and forge a valid signature by linearly combining their
corresponding signatures: e′x = e
′
i1
+ e′i2 + . . . e
′
iN
.
As mentioned, to prevent this risk, the signer adds a random codeword c, with
weight wc ≪ n, to the error vector e, before multiplication by ST . This way, the
mapW becomes an affine map which depends on the random codeword c, and it
no longer has the set of valid signatures as its image. In fact, we can denote this
new map as Wc(s), such that e
′
1 = Wc1(s1) and e
′
2 = Wc2(s2), where c1 and c2
are two randomly selected codewords of the private code with weight wc. If we
linearly combine the signatures, we obtain e′f = e
′
1 + e
′
2 =Wc1(s1) +Wc2(s2) =
Wc1+c2(s1 + s2). The vector c1 + c2 is still a valid codeword of the secret code,
but it has weight > wc with a very high probability.
3.3 Signature verification
After receiving the message M , its signature e′ and the associated parameter
ΘM , the verifier first checks that the weight of e
′ is ≤ (mTw + wc)mS . If this
condition is not satisfied, the signature is discarded. Then the verifier computes
ŝ = FΘM (H(M)) and checks that ŝ has weight w, otherwise the signature is
discarded. If the previous checks have been positive, the verifier then computes
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H ′·e′T = Q−1·H ·S−1·S·(eT+cT ) = Q−1·H ·(eT+cT ) = Q−1·H ·eT = Q−1·s′ = s.
If s = ŝ, the signature is accepted; otherwise, it is discarded.
3.4 Number of different signatures
An important parameter for any digital signature scheme is the total number of
different signatures. In our case, a different signature corresponds to a different r-
bit vector s, having weight w. Only vectors s satisfying the z constraints imposed
by b are acceptable, so the maximum number of different signatures is:
Ns ≈
(
r
w
)
2z
. (7)
4 Possible vulnerabilities
For a security assessment of the proposed system, it would be desirable to find
possible security reductions to some well known hard problems, and then to
evaluate the complexity of practical attacks aimed at solving such problems.
This activity is still at the beginning, and work is in progress in this direction.
Hence, in this paper we only provide a sketch of some possible vulnerabilities
we have already devised, which permit to obtain a first rough estimate of the
security level of the system. Completing the security assessment will allow to
improve the security level estimation, and possibly to find more effective choices
of the system parameters.
From the definition of the proposed system, it follows that the published
signature e′ associated to a document M is always a sparse vector, with Ham-
ming weight ≤ (mTw + wc)mS . Since e′ is an error vector corresponding to the
public syndrome s through the public code parity-check matrix H ′, having a low
Hamming weight ensures that e′ is difficult to find, starting from s and H ′. This
is achieved by using the weight controlling matrix Q and the sparse matrix S.
If this was not the case, and e′ was a dense vector, it would be easy to forge
signatures, since a dense vector corresponding to s through H ′ is easy to find.
Based on these considerations, one could think that choosing both Q and S
as sparse as possible would be a good solution. Let us suppose that they are
two permutation matrices, P1 and P2. In this case, the public matrix would be
H ′ = PT1 ·H ·PT2 , and both s′ and e′ would be sparse, thus avoiding easy forgeries.
Actually, a first reason for avoiding to use permutation matrices is that, when
masked only through permutations, the security of H decreases. In fact, using
a doubly permuted version of H may still allow to perform decoding through
the public code. However, neglecting for a moment this fact, we find that, in
this case, e′ would have weight ≤ w + wc. If e and c have disjoint supports,
which is very likely true, since we deal with sparse vectors, w non-zero bits in
e′ would correspond to a reordered version of the non-zero bits in s. So, apart
from the effect of the random codeword, we would simply have a disposition
of the non-zero bits in s within e′, according to a fixed pattern. This pattern
could be discovered by an attacker who observes a sufficiently large number
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of signatures, so that the effect of the random codeword could be eliminated.
In fact, by computing the intersection of the supports of many vectors s and
their corresponding vectors e′, the support of e′ could be decomposed and the
reordering of each bit disclosed.
Based on these considerations, we can conclude that the density of e′ must
be carefully chosen between two opposite needs:
– being sufficiently low to avoid forgeries;
– being sufficiently high to avoid support decompositions.
4.1 Forgery attacks
In order to forge signatures, an attacker could search for an n× r right-inverse
matrix H ′r of H
′. Then, he could compute f = (H ′r · s)T , which is a forged
signature. It is easy to find a right-inverse matrix able to forge dense signatures.
In fact, provided that H ′ ·H ′T is invertible, H ′r = H ′T ·
(
H ′ ·H ′T )−1 is a right-
inverse matrix of H ′. The matrix H ′ is dense and the same occurs, in general,
for
(
H ′ ·H ′T )−1; so, H ′r is dense as well. It follows that, when multiplied by s,
H ′r produces a dense vector, thus allowing to forge dense signatures. By using
sparse signatures, with weight ≤ (mTw+wc)mS , the proposed system is robust
against this kind of forged signatures.
However, the right-inverse matrix is not unique. So, the attacker could search
for an alternative, possibly sparse, right-inverse matrix. In fact, given an n× n
matrix Z such that H ′ · Z · H ′T is invertible, H ′′r = Z · H ′T ·
(
H ′ · Z ·H ′T )−1
is another valid right-inverse matrix of H ′. We notice that H ′′r 6= Z ·H ′r. When
H ′ contains an invertible r× r square block, there is also another simple way to
find a right-inverse. It is obtained by inverting such block, putting its inverse at
the same position (in a transposed matrix) in which it is found within H ′, and
padding the remaining rows with zeros.
In any case, there is no simple way to find a right-inverse matrix that is also
sparse, which is the aim of an attacker. Actually, for the matrix sizes considered
here, the number of possible choices of Z is always huge. Moreover, there is
no guarantee that any of them produces a sparse right-inverse. Searching for an
r×r invertible block withinH ′ and inverting it would also produce unsatisfactory
results, since the overall density of H ′−1 is reduced, but the inverse of the square
block is still dense. So, the attacker would be able to forge signatures with a
number of symbols 1 on the order of r/2, that is still too large for the system
considered here. In fact, in the system examples we provide in Section 5, we
always consider public signatures with weight on the order of r/3 or less.
A further chance is to exploit Stern’s algorithm [29] (or other approaches for
searching low weight codewords) to find a sparse representation of the column
space of H ′r. If this succeeds, it would result in a sparse matrix HS = H
′
r ·B, for
some r × r transformation matrix B. However, in this case, HS would not be a
right-inverse of H ′.
For these reasons, approaches based on right-inverses seem to be infeasible for
an attacker. An alternative attack strategy could be based on decoding. In fact,
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an attacker could try syndrome decoding of s throughH ′, hoping to find a sparse
vector f . He would have the advantage of searching for one out of many possible
vectors, since he is not looking for a correctable error vector. Several algorithms
could be exploited for solving such problem [8, 10, 11, 20, 27]. These algorithms
are commonly used to search for low weight vectors with a null syndrome, but,
with a small modification, they can also be used to find vectors corresponding
to a given (non-zero) syndrome. In addition, their complexity decreases when an
attacker has access to a high number of decoding instances, and wishes to solve
only one of them [28], which is the case for the proposed system. We will discuss
the complexity issue in Section 5.
4.2 Support decomposition attacks
Concerning support decomposition, let us suppose that e and c have disjoint
supports. In this case, the overall effect of the proposed scheme on the public
syndrome s can be seen as the expansion of an r× 1 vector s of weight w into a
subset of the support of the 1× n vector e′, having weight ≤ mTmSw, in which
each symbol 1 in s corresponds, at most, to m = mTmS symbols 1 in e
′.
An attacker could try to find the w sets of m (or less) symbols 1 within the
support of e′ in order to compute valid signatures. In this case, he will work as if
the random codeword was absent, that is, c = 01×n. Thus, even after succeeding,
he would be able to forge signatures that are sparser than the authentic ones. In
any case, this seems a rather dangerous situation, so we should aim at designing
the system in such a way as to avoid its occurrence.
To reach his target, the attacker must collect a sufficiently large number L of
pairs (s, e′). Then, he can intersect the supports (that is, compute the bit-wise
AND) of all the s vectors. This way, he obtains a vector sL that may have a small
weight wL ≥ 1. If this succeeds, the attacker analyzes the vectors e′, and selects
the mwL set bit positions that appear more frequently. If these bit positions
are actually those corresponding to the wL bits set in sL, then the attacker
has discovered the relationship between them. An estimate of the probability of
success of this attack can be obtained through combinatorial arguments.
An even more efficient strategy could be to exploit information set decoding
to remove the effect of the random codeword. In fact, an attacker knows that
e′ = (e + c) · ST = e′′ + c′′, with c′′ such that H ′c′′ = 0. Hence, e′′ can be
considered as an error vector with weight ≤ mTmSw affecting the codeword
c′′ of the public code. So the attacker could consider a random subset of k
coordinates of the public signature e′ and assume that no errors occurred on
these coordinates. In this case, he can easily recover c′′ and, hence, remove the
effect of the random codeword c. The probability that there are no errors in
the chosen k coordinates is
(
n−mTmSw
k
)
/
(
n
k
)
, and its inverse provides a rough
estimate of the work factor of this attack.
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4.3 Key recovery attacks
An attacker could aim to mount a key recovery attack, that is, to obtain the
private code. A potential vulnerability in this sense comes from the use of LDGM
codes. As we have seen in Section 2, LDGM codes offer the advantage of having
a predictable (and sufficiently high) number of codewords with a moderately
low weight wc, and of making their random selection very easy for the signer.
On the other hand, when the private code is an LDGM code, the public code
admits a generator matrix in the form G′I = G · ST , which is still rather sparse.
So, the public code contains low weight codewords, coinciding with the rows of
G′I , which have weight approximately equal to wg · mS . Since G′I has k rows,
and summing any two of them gives higher weight codewords with a very high
probability, we can consider that the multiplicity of these words in the public
code is k. They could be searched by using again Stern’s algorithm [29] and its
improved versions [8, 10, 11, 20, 27], in such a way as to recover G′I . After that,
G′I could be separated into G and S
T by exploiting their sparsity. In Section 5
we discuss how to estimate the work factor of this attack.
Another possible vulnerability comes from the fact that the matrix b is public.
Even if b was not public, an attacker could obtain the vector space generated by b,
as well as its dual space, by observing O(r) public syndromes s, since b·s = 0z×1.
Hence, we must suppose that an attacker knows an r × r matrix V such that
R · V = 0 ⇒ Q · V = T · V . The attacker also knows that H ′ = Q−1 ·H · S−1
and that the public code admits any non-singular generator matrix in the form
G′X = X · G · ST , which becomes G′Q = Q · G · ST for X = Q. Obviously, G′I
is the sparsest among them, and it can be attacked by searching for low weight
codewords in the public code, as we have already observed. Instead, knowing V is
useless to reduce the complexity of attacking either H ′ or one of the possible G′X ,
hence it cannot be exploited by an attacker to perform a key recovery attack.
4.4 Other attacks
As for any other hash-and-sign scheme, classical collision birthday attacks repre-
sent a threat for the proposed system. Since the system admits up to Ns different
signatures, it is sufficient to collect ≈ √Ns different signatures to have a high
probability of finding a collision [19]. Hence, the security level reached by the
system cannot exceed
√
Ns.
However, Ns can be made sufficiently high by increasing the value of w.
The definition of the proposed system allows to choose its parameters in such a
way as to guarantee this fact, as we will see in Section 5. This is possible since
the choice of w is not constrained by the row weight of the private generator
matrix. In fact, in the proposed scheme we do not actually need a private code
of minimum distance greater than 2w, because we rely on a decoding procedure
which uniquely associates to a syndrome of a given weight an error vector with
the same weight, though such an error vector is not necessarily unique.
Finally, it is advisable to consider the most dangerous attacks against the CFS
scheme. It was successfully attacked by exploiting syndrome decoding based on
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the generalized birthday algorithm [14], even if the proposed attacking algorithm
was not the optimal generalization of the birthday algorithm [22]. If we do not
take into account some further improvement due to the QC structure of the
public key, these algorithms provide a huge work factor for the proposed system
parameters, since they try to solve the decoding problem for a random code. Just
to give an idea, we obtain a work factor of more than 2200 binary operations even
for the smallest key sizes we consider. However, there are some strategies that can
be implemented to improve the efficiency of the attack on structured matrices,
like those of dyadic codes [25]. This improvement could be extended to QC codes
as well, but the attack work factor, for the cryptosystems analyzed in [25], is
lowered by (at most) 210 binary operations, starting from a maximum value of
2344. Hence, it is very unlikely that this strategy can endanger the signature
scheme we propose.
5 System examples
By using the preliminary security assessment reported in Section 4, we can find
some possible choices of the system parameters aimed at reaching fixed security
levels. For this purpose, we have considered all the vulnerabilities described in
Section 4, and we have estimated the work factor needed to mount a successful
attack exploiting each of them.
We have used the implementation proposed in [27] for estimating the work
factor of low weight codeword searches. Actually, [27] does not contain the most
up-to-date and efficient implementation of information set decoding. In fact,
some improvements have appeared in the literature concerning algorithms for
decoding binary random codes (as [20], [8]). These papers, however, aim at find-
ing algorithms which are asymptotically faster, by minimizing their asymptotic
complexity exponents. Instead, for computing the work factor of attacks based
on decoding, we need actual operation counts, which are not reflected in these
recent works. Also “ball collision decoding” [10] achieves significant improve-
ments asymptotically, but they become negligible for finite code lengths and not
too high security levels. For these reasons, we prefer to resort to [27], which
provides a detailed analysis of the algorithm, together with a precise operation
count for given code parameters. On the other hand, attacks against the pro-
posed system which exploit decoding, i.e., trying to recover the rows of G or to
forge valid signatures through decoding algorithms, are far away from providing
the smallest work factors, and, hence, to determine the security level. For the
choices of the system parameters we suggest, the smallest work factor is always
achieved by attacks aiming at decomposing the signature support, which hence
coincides with the security level. For the instances proposed in this section, the
work factor of attacks based on decoding is on the order of 22SL, where SL is
the claimed security level. Hence, even considering some reduction in the work
factor of decoding attacks would not change the security level of the considered
instances of the system. This situation does not change even if we consider the
improvement coming from the “decoding one out of many” approach [28]. In
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Table 1. System parameters for some security levels (SL), with d = 2 and wL = 2.
SL (bits) n k p w wg wc z mT mS Awc Ns Sk (KiB)
80 9800 4900 50 18 20 160 2 1 9 282.76 2166.10 117
120 24960 10000 80 23 25 325 2 1 14 2140.19 2242.51 570
160 46000 16000 100 29 31 465 2 1 20 2169.23 2326.49 1685
fact, as shown in [28], even if an attacker has access to an unlimited number
of decoding instances, the attack complexity is raised by a power slightly larger
than 2/3.
Concerning support decomposition attacks, a rough estimation of their com-
plexity has instead been obtained through simple combinatorial arguments,
which are not reported here for the sake of brevity.
A more detailed analysis of the attacks work factor is out of scope of this
paper, and will be addressed in future works, together with a more complete
security assessment. This will also permit to refine the choice of the system
parameters, in such a way as to find the best trade-off between the security level
and the key size.
Table 1 provides three choices of the system parameters which are aimed at
achieving 80-bit, 120-bit and 160-bit security, respectively. All these instances
of the system use QC-LDGM codes with different values of p, also reported in
the table, and consider the case in which the matrix Q is such that d = wL = 2.
Actually, achieving minimum distance equal to 2 (or more) is very easy: it is
sufficient to choose z > 1 and to guarantee that the matrix b does not contain
all-zero columns. For each instance of the system, the value of the key size Sk is
also shown, expressed in kibibytes (1 KiB = 1024 · 8 bits).
In the original version of the CFS system, to achieve an attack time and
memory complexity greater than 280, we need to use a Goppa code with length
n = 221 and redundancy r = 21 ·10 = 210 [14]. This gives a key size on the order
of 4.4 ·108 bits = 52.5 MiB. By using the parallel CFS proposed in [15], the same
work factor can be reached by using keys with size ranging between 1.05 ·107 and
1.7 · 108 bits, that is, between 1.25 MiB and 20 MiB. As we notice from Table
1, the proposed system requires a public key of only 117 KiB to achieve 80-bit
security. Hence, it is able to achieve a dramatic reduction in the public key size
compared to the CFS scheme, even when using a parallel implementation of the
latter.
Another advantage of the proposed solution compared to the CFS scheme is
that it exploits a straightforward decoding procedure for the secret code. On the
other hand, 2z attempts are needed, on average, to find an s vector such that
b · s = 0z×1. However, such a check is very simple to perform, especially for very
small values of z, like those considered here.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have addressed the problem of achieving efficient code-based
digital signatures with small public keys.
We have proposed a solution that, starting from the CFS schemes, exploits
LDGM codes and sparse syndromes to achieve good security levels with compact
keys. The proposed system also has the advantage of using a straightforward
decoding procedure, which reduces to a transposition and a concatenation with
an all-zero vector. This is considerably faster than classical decoding algorithms
used for common families of codes.
The proposed scheme allows to use a wide range of choices of the code pa-
rameters. In particular, the low code rates we adopt avoid some problems of the
classical CFS scheme, due to the use of codes with high rate and small correction
capability.
On the other hand, using sparse vectors may expose the system to new at-
tacks. We have provided a sketch of possible vulnerabilities affecting this system,
together with a preliminary evaluation of its security level. Work is in progress
to achieve more precise work factor estimates for the most dangerous attacks.
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